law; crucial here is the fact that citizens' law-abidingness is voluntary, hence the salience of legislative preludes' pedagogical role (pp. 27-8).
Schofield's account of Laws 5.739a-e assumes its presentation of Magnesia as 'second best' (739b3) compared with Kallipolis (p. 16) -an interpretation assumed at all relevant junctures in the volume, Bobonich's stress (p. 2) on scholars' lack of consensus regarding the passage notwithstanding. From the fact that, as Schofield maintains, 'the ideals of community, equality and friendship are still guiding principles' (p. 16) in Magnesia, it need not follow that Kallipolis itself is the ideal being approximated. 2 Both the Republic and the Laws seek to approach the unity symbolized by the former's finger analogy (462c-d) as nearly as possible. In the Laws, however, unlike the Republic (464d with 416c-417b, 464a), Plato sees clearly that eliminating private possessions and instituting other measures with only a minority of the citizenry in view is not the sole path worth attempting. In fact, maximal unity across the citizen population tout court, featured at 739c7-d2, is the aim of key measures including all citizens' substantive paideia, the premium placed on citizens' deep mutual familiarity, and their responsibility to promote harmony through helping to bring its disrupters to justice. The passage's summation at d3-4 (kai kata dunamin hoitines nomoi mian hoti malista polin apergazontai) reflects most directly the Laws', not the Republic's, notion of how to promote the regulative ideal they share since only here do nomoi themselves constitute the foremost agency through which unity is produced. 3 This alternative reading of Laws 739a-e would conceivably render the gap between the dialogue's dual threads as treated by Schofield somewhat less pronounced. Either way, however, Schofield is surely right to foreground, contra Aristotle, the two strands' intertwining and to identify as Plato's ultimate concern the best outcome simpliciter, not merely the best one can hope for given existent limitations. Schofield's illumining defence of this stance will surely promote further, fresh exploration of the dialogue's political aims.
Chapter 2: In 'The Relationship of the Laws to Other Dialogues: A Proposal', Christopher Rowe maintains that the dialogue operates on two planes: that of the Athenian Stranger's interlocutors and most Magnesian coloniststo-be, and a more elevated level that 'we, as readers, have to put in some effort to excavate' (pp. 32-3). The latter audience must 'read the Laws together with other dialogues (without distinction, i.e., not just dialogues of some particular "period"), at the risk of not understanding, with any completeness, what the
